Stigler gave five lectures at the LSE that were published as a separate booklet. 19 Near the end of the second lecture Stigler remarks, "I wish to close by offering an estimate of the net contribution of the attempt to construct a theory of monopolistic competition. Before undertaking this appraisal, however, it is necessary to set forth certain methodological principles," (23) . Stigler then writes:
"The purpose of the study of economics to permit us to make predictions about the behavior of economic phenomena under specified conditions. The sole test of the usefulness of an economic theory is the concordance between its predictions and the observable course of events. Often a theory is criticized or rejected because its assumptions are "unrealistic." Granting for a moment that this charge has meaning, it burdens theory with an additional function, that of description. This is a most unreasonable burden to place upon theory: the role of description is to particularize, while the role of theory is to generalize-to disregard an infinite number of differences and capture the important common element in different phenomena." (Five Lectures, 23).
Stigler adds the following footnote: "The present interpretation of these principles is due to "Its task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances. Its performance is to be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the predictions it yields. … In so far as a theory can be said to have 'assumptions' at all, and in so far as their 'realism' can be judged independently of the validity of predictions, the relation between the significance of a theory and the 'realism' of its 'assumptions' is almost the opposite of that suggested by the view under criticism. Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense)," (F1953, 4 and 14)
Stigler While a few of these offer remarkable similarities none is decisive for my overall argument. 24 Earlier in the Five Lectures, in his treatment of Marshall, Stigler made a point of citing the relevant chapter of Structure not the earlier journal articles on which they are based (5). 25 Cf. Parsons on the relationship between economics and sociology: "The inescapable conclusion from this fact is…there is no place for a logically separate body of principles of economics. Economics must be merely the application to a particular body of concrete phenomena of the general principles necessary for understanding human conduct. If any single name is applicable to this body of theory it is "encyclopedic sociology," the synthesis of all scientific theory relevant to the concrete facts of human behavior in society. Economics then becomes applied sociology," (Structure, 173). See also: "It commits him [Souter], like his master Alfred Marshall, to an "economic imperialism" in the bad sense of suppressing the "rights" of neighboring sciences to an "independent" existence in the society of the sciences…It will be necessary to to consider the place of economics in the whole system of the sciences of action," (T. Parsons, "Some Reflections on the "Nature and Significance of Economics," QJE, 1943, p. 522; this may be the first use of "economic imperialism.") Second, Parsons and Friedman offer a similar two-fold conceptual structure of theories.
Parsons writes approvingly that according to Pareto: "science is best characterized by the term 'logico-experimental.'" Parsons explains:
"That is to say, there are two essential elements involved: logical reasoning and observation of 'fact.' Logical reasoning is by itself incapable of yielding necessary results beyond tautologies, but none the less it is an essential element. It is thought of, however, as subordinate to the other element, that of fact, experimental or observed." (181; scare-quotes in Parsons).
Friedman's conceptual structure also stresses the tautological aspect of one part of theory and the empirical of the other part:
"theory is, in general, a complex intermixture of two elements. In part, it is a 'language' designed to promote 'systematic and organized methods of reasoning.' In part, it is a body of substantive hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of complex reality.
Viewed as a language, theory has no substantive content; it is a set of tautologies. Its function is to serve as a filing system organizing empirical material and facilitating our understanding of it; and the criteria by which it is to be judged are appropriate to a filing system. … Factual evidence alone can show whether the categories of the 'analytical filing system' have a meaningful empirical counterpart, that is, whether they are useful in analyzing particular class of concrete problems" (F1953, 7) .
Friedman has switched from the language of subordination (between the tautological and empirical part) to the more neutral language of serving a function. Moreover, Friedman introduces an important function of theory characteristic of his more general outlook: it makes possible the analysis of concrete problems. 28 Third, this last point is connected to a very important example in Friedman's argument:
his treatment of Galileo's law of fall which runs through F1953.
"We may start with a simple physical example, the law of falling bodies. It is an accepted hypothesis that the acceleration of a body dropped in a vacuum is a constant …and is independent of the shape of the body, the manner of dropping it, etc…. The application of this formula to a compact ball dropped from the roof of a building is equivalent to saying that a ball so dropped behaves as if it were falling in a vacuum. … Suppose, however, that a feather is dropped instead of a compact ball. The formula then gives wildly inaccurate results," (F1953, 16-17ff; see also 24, 36).
29
Friedman was not the first to employ the example in this fashion. According to Parsons, Pareto "resorts to the methodological device of analyzing an abstract society, which is exactly analogous to the device of treating bodies as if they fell in a vacuum. The situation is closely analogous to that in which mechanics would be if all bodies on this earth were of a density relative to that of the atmosphere approximating that of feathers. The law of gravitation could be scarcely be arrived at by a process of empirical generalization from their actual behavior in nature, or by dropping them from high places. But this would be no reason why the law of gravitation would fail to hold in such a world…Scientific progress is a matter of successive approximation. Therefore the meanings of the symbols employed in scientific theories are 28 This fits with his larger claim during this period that many of the relevant details of the component parts of the economy are not known yet. From Parsons' account it is not obvious if fall in a vacuum is the example that Pareto uses (or merely a helpful illustration by Parsons of Pareto's willingness to treat a society in abstraction). 30 Parsons turns Pareto's use of abstraction into a defense of successive approximation and an attack on crude empiricism. In the world where all bodies were of a density relative to that of the atmosphere approximating that of feathers the law of fall would seem to presuppose wildly unrealistic assumptions. Yet it would still be true.
Parsons' treatment of Pareto shows that when dealing with messy empirical details through abstraction or as-if modeling one can simultaneously hold that one's assumptions are unrealistic and still think one's theory is appropriate in the analysis of a concrete example. This is a theme that runs through Parsons' book. In fact, he seems to identify it as a key factor in theoretical success: "Utterly dependent logically on this "erroneous" premise [i.e., identity of interests] 31 there grew up what is perhaps the most highly developed theoretical system in the social sciences [utilitarianism] with correct results-within certain limitations. This fact may serve as a lesson to those who are overly puristic in their scientific methodology. Perhaps it is not always wise to discard even methodologically objectionable elements so long as they serve a useful scientific function, unless one has something better to substitute" (101). Upon re-reading F1953 in light of my argument, one must find the following oft-ignored passage striking: "The abstract model corresponding to this hypothesis contains two "ideal" types of firms: atomistically competitive firms, grouped into industries, and monopolistic firms. A firm is competitive if the demand curve for its output is infinitely elastic with respect to its own price for some price and all outputs, given the prices charged by all other firms; it belongs to an "industry" defined as a group of firms producing a single "product" ... A firm is monopolistic if the demand curve for its output is not infinitely elastic at some price for all outputs. 29 … As always, the hypothesis as a whole consists not only of this abstract model and its ideal types but also of a set of rules, mostly implicit and suggested by example, for identifying actual firms with one or the other ideal type and for classifying firms into industries. The ideal types are not intended to be descriptive; they are designed to isolate the features that are crucial for a particular problem." (35).
It is accompanied by the following footnote:
"29. This ideal type can be divided into two types: the oligopolistic firm, if the demand curve for its output is infinitely elastic at some price for some but not all outputs; the monopolistic firm proper, if the demand curve is nowhere infinitely elastic." This is the passage in which Friedman explains how theory is an "engine" for research in Second, recall that in F1953 theory's "function is to serve as a filing system organizing empirical material and facilitating our understanding of it" (7). This is no isolated occurrence. In fact, in defending his focus on as if theorizing and predictability, Friedman writes, "A meaningful scientific hypothesis or theory typically asserts that certain forces are, and other forces are not,
